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ABSTRACT 
If current national and international declarations on human rights tend to 
recognise a "right to housing ", the exact meaning of such provisions remains 
a controversial issue. In France. the Constitution oj 1958 does not proclaim 
such a right. The constitutional judge considers "the possibility Jar any person 
oj having decent housing" as "an objective oj constitutional value". However. 
this norm is mostly interpreted as a goal oj general interest. It gives a basis to 
public intervention aimed at building social housing. but also aimed at acting 
on the private market oj housing (especially by regulating leasing agreements. 
Jar example. prohibiting the owner from freely putting an end to the lease or 
obliging him to provide a decent dwellmg). ThereJore. the constitutional objec-
tive oj aI/owing any person access to decent housing does not allow an appli-
cant to claim housing in court. On the contrary, while interpreting section 26 oj 
the Constitution oj 1996. the South AJrican Constitutional Court emphasised the 
obligations lying directly on the state. According to the Jurisdiction. section 26 
imposes the adoption oj a co-ordinated and comprehensive state housing 
programme. which must meet with short. medIUm and long term needs. This 
position is closer to an efJicient concept oj the "right to housing" than the 
French one. Such a right must be based on national solidarity. so that only the 
state can implement it. The measures taken in France concerning leasing agree-
ments are necessarily limited: they can restrict the owners' rights. but not 
violate them. Furthermore, they are useless for people who do not already have 
a roof over their heads. It appears thar rhe obligations deduced from a constitu-
tional "right to housing" can befulfilled only by direct public inrervention (con-
sisting in giving land. housing or Jmanclal means Jar dwellings). On that point. 
doubts exist about the share oj competences between the state and non-central 
state organs. This issue could be at stake infuture constitutional case law. 
The way in which the declarations oj rights tackle the question oj housing 
evolved during the second half oj the 20th century. Initially. no explicit provi-
sion was devoted to housing. reference was only made to housing in an 
indirect way. On a world level. the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 
1948. Jollowed by the Covenant on the Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
treat access to housing anI( indirectly. as a component oj the right to a 
suJJicient standard oj living. On the level oj the Council of Europe. the "right 
I Universal Iklldr,Hioll o[llllJrndll I{igills, ,HI ::!5, 9 I: Covefli"lIll on Economic, Social and 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
to housing" does not appear in the initial version oj the European Social 
Charter, adopted in 1961. It made its entry only at the time of the recasting of 
the text in 1996, with article 31.' 
In France, afirst draft of the Constitution in April 1946, rejected by refer-
endum, put forward a declaration of rights of which articles 22 to 38 ac-
knowledged 'social and economic rights '. But the question of housing was not 
tackled there. Neither was it mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution of 
October 1946, which text served as a form of compromise after the rejection 
of the text of April. This preamble only presents in a synthetic way the prin-
cipal rights proclaimed by the first project. ThiS apparent disinterest. despite 
the difficulties of housing in France of post-war period, undoubtedly reflects 
the conceptions then prevalent in Europe. The stress is indeed laid on the 
rights to social protection. The programmed generalisation oj social security 
must protect individuals against social risk and. thus. must guarantee perma-
nence oj income in order to satisfy the individual's fundamental needs, the 
first of which is housing. In a simplistic way, one can say that the economic 
crisis and the consequent rise of unemployment challenged this vision of 
things. The limits of a system of rights depending on stable and durable wage-
earning appeared. Thus emerged concepts oj "new poverty", "precariousness" 
and especially "exclusion ": as many terms describing the "growing /low oj 
those which are rejected from normal socialization by paid work and which. 
consequently, see themselves privated from social protection ".' The need for 
guaranteeing every person's right of access to the baSIC needs, and to housing 
in particular, regained its acuity. 
The majority of declarations of rights in the last part of the 20th century 
represent these socio-economic evolutions, in Europe, recent constitutional 
amendments significantly sanction the "right to housing," including the 
constitutIOns of Portugal,' Spain' and Belgium, according to article 23 in-
serted by the constitutional revision of 199.3. In France, the legislator initially 
appeared to move toward such a recognition. Then, in 1995, the Constitu-
tional Council judges, on the basis of the preamble of 1946. still in force 
owing to its inclusion in the current Constitution of 1958, held that "the 
possibility for any person of having a decent housing constitutes an objective 
of constitutional value".M Whether or not the housing shortage reaches the 
same proportions as in South Africa. the comparison between the two coun-
tries is nevertheless interesting. In South Africa, social rights were entrenched 
in the Constitution of 1996. The right to have access to adequate housing has 
been the subject of two judgments of the Constitutional Court.' The two 
2 Ellropean Social (,horter (reVised). pan I. an 31. ""EVeryorle has tile right [Q housing"; 
pan II, an 11' ""Wi[h a view [0 ensuring (Ire effective exercise of (he right [0 housing. Ihe 
PClrues undertake [Q take measures designed. ! [0 pron,Ole access 10 housing of an ade-
quate standard; 2 to prevent and reduce 110rnelessness with a view of iLS gradual elimi· 
nation; 110 make Ihe price of housing accessible to [hose wilhou[ at1eqllate resources". 
J R l.alore ] {}S9: 567 
4 An 65 ut" lhe Cons[iUHron of J 976. 
5 An 17 of rhe [O[lSlitlHion of 1978 
6 C C , rlOle 94- 359 IX of J 9 January 1995, Diversi[{; de {hull/WI, COliS nOEl' 7. 
7 efT I lIOO, 4 Oclot)(-'r 2000, GroD/b()()m anil (J/has, reT 55100, 29 May 2001, Kyulaml 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
jurisdictions are thus Jacing the same difJiculty in deJining the contents oj 
provisions oj which the binding eJJect is still sometimes disputed. This ques-
tion takes on a particular complexity for housing, access to which can be 
concretised by a polhy with varied instruments. In addition to the exact 
determination oj the basis oj such a policy (/), it is thus advisable to examine 
the contentious problems which may arise through the constitutional control 
oj its implementation (II) 
1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE HOUSING POLICY 
The fundamental rights and freedoms codiFied in 1996 in South AFrica's 
Constitution are pan of the basis of the new constitutional and political 
order. For this reason, it appeared essential to provide them concrete and 
effective guarantees. The system of judicial review retained appears as a 
"compromise"~: without barring the intervention of the ordinary jurisdic-
tions, which can be called upon, if necessary, to protect the rights of 
individuals, it ensures the Constitutional Court the final capacity to decide 
on all questions of constitutionality," This Court was quickly asked to give 
its interpretation of the "right to have access to adequate hOusing" It 
deduced from it the obligation of a co-ordinated programme of housing, 
and thus the obligation to provide relief to people in desperate need. In 
France, the Constitulional Council has exclusive competence for the 
control of constitutionality of laws. Although the ordinary JUrisdictions 
sometimes have occasion to apply consritutional norms, they may not mal{e 
judgments on matters concerning the constitutional objective of access to 
decem housing, as this objective is not considered to entrench a directly 
justiciable right. This pOSition consolidates the case law of the Constitutional 
Council, which interprets the objective as one of general Interest, establish-
ing a housing policy but not conferring justiciable rights to individuals. 
1 ,1 The position of the constitutional judges 
The reasoning of the two Cons[itutional Courts is founded on Similar 
premises, with regard to the bond between access to housing and other 
constitutional principles, as well as the margin of appreciation devolved to 
Lhe public authorities to guarantee it. The constilutional nature of the stan· 
dard of decent or adequate housing forces, however, the imposition of 
some limits. Nevertheless, the case law of the Constitutional Council re-
mains vague, and seems to dissuade radical questioning of the social hous-
ing policy. The South AFrican Court, on the contrary, exerrs tighter control 
on the reasonable character of [he measures taken, having led to the af-
firmation of an obligation on the state (Q provide at least minimal services. 
1,1,1 Similar premises 
The acknowledgement of the need for housing in the case law of the Con-
stitutional Council was made in two stages. In a decision of 29 May 1990, 
H X Ptllilppe 1997 ,172. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
the High Coun declared that "promoting the housing of the underprivi-
leged people. . answers LO a requirement of national interest". JO Then in 
another case of 19 January 1995, it affirms that "the possibility for any 
person of having a decem housing is an objective of constitutional 
value".!1 Whereas the Constitutional Council often confines itself to a 
literal application of the texts. it founds this second assertion on a dy~ 
namic interpretation of several constitutional principles. Indeed, the 
objective is Initially deduced from the principle of human dignity, How-
ever, this last principle was established by the Council, in the Bioerhics 
decision of 1994, I It was used here for the first Lime in the field of [he 
socio-economic rights, whereas some authors restricted its application to 
the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of the person.' 
The objective also rests on subparagraph 10 of the preamble to the Consti-
tution of 1946, which guarantees to the individual and to the family the 
conditions necessary LO their development. and its subparagraph I 1, 
which sanctions material security and the right to receive suitable means 
of existence from society. 14 The Constitutional Council thus confirms the 
interdependence of the socio-economic rights and the central place of the 
principle of dignity in the current recognition of fundamental rights. 
The CrootiJoom decision begins by referring to tasks assigned by the 
preamble to the Constitution: "the attainment of social juslice" and "the 
improvement of the quality of life for everyone". It also points out the 
founding values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. These principles inspire the 
Bill of Rights, which binds all public authorities according to section 7(2) 
of the Constitution. IS The Court concludes from it that the justiciability of 
the right to adequate housing, which is part of the Bill of Rights, cannot be 
denied. The reasoning is thus based on a systematic interpretation of the 
constitutional text. The principle of dignity in particular appears essential 
(0 evaluate the range of the official obligations as regards housing.l~ 
Another similarity in the reasoning of the two constitutional jurisdic-
tions lies in the assertion of the priority competence of the public authori-
ties, legislative and executive, to concretise the constitutional standard of 
J 0 c.( . flUle 90 274 DC of 29 May 1 l)9U, Droi( au /oyernenr, UHl~ n01!! !"3 
I! (.C. note 94-159 DC of 19 jantJary 199~, Dlversite de /'ha/ntar. cons. nOLl' 7 
12 C ,C, nole 94-141-144 DC of 27 july! 994, l:lioethir/lle, COliS. notc 2. The rrinciple of 
hutndll riignity is bdsed on lile preamble to the Constitution of 27 Octo{wr 19·16: "!n Ihe 
morrow of II Ie victory achieved by tile tree peoples over the regimes that had soughl to 
enslave and df:grale hww-lIlily, the people 01 Francc proclaim anew that each human be-
ing, witllUllt distinction of rdce, religio[, and creed, posses~e~ ~crcd rlJld inalienable rights" 
1"3 B Mathieu 19lJ6: 2gS; V ~alnt-james 1997, 62 
14 § 10 of the preamble to the C:onstitlJtiOJl of' 27 October 19,16: "The nalion shall provide 
tite Irldivlcill;)1 and (ite lamily wi til tile conduiolls necessary to their rkvdoplTlt!!l("; § I I 
"It shall gl!drdrll~e (0 nil, nOLdbly [0 children, mothers and elderly workers, protection of 
(Ii('ir Iwalth, material seClJri(y, rest and leisure. All people who, by virtIJ(! of their age, 
physiCal or ITI(~Jllal condilion, or economic situation. afe Incapable of working, shall 
huve tile right lO receive sllildble mt-'dns of t!xistcnce from society" 
j 5 q 20 01 tl\t~ judgment 










































THE HIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
decent or adequate housing. Thus, the french Constitutional Council 
decision of 1995, after having established the objective of constitutional 
value, adds that it "falls as well (Q the legislator as to the government [0 
determine, in accordance with their respective competcnces, methods of 
implemenling this objective". This expression is usual on social matters. It 
is employed in particular in connection with subparagraphs 10 and I I of 
the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, in that they are founding the 
access to social security benefitsl!. The public authoritles then have an 
important margin of appreciation in the implementation of the consti(U-
lional principles. 
Analysing article 26 of the Constitution, the Soulh African Court notes 
that the second paragraph specifies the obligation weighing on Ihe stale 
by providing Ihat this one "must take reasonable legislative and olher 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive reali-
sation of the right." It adds that the contours and content of the measures 
to be adopted are primarily a matter for the legislalUre and the executive. 
The two jurisdictions thus recognise a broad margin of appreciation to 
the public authorities in the concretisation of the right. Such a margin 
could not, however, be without limits, as an unlimited margin would inevi~ 
tably negate the constitutional principle of access to decent or adequate 
hOUSing. Ilowever, it is in Ihe analysis of the eXlent to which the obliga-
tions stemming from the right of access to adequate housing and lhe 
objective of prOViding decent housing weigh on the state that the attitude 
of the two couns differs. 
1.1.2 Different conclusions 
In the Groolboom decision, the Coun nOLes that paragraph 2 of section 26 
establishes a limit to the discretionary power of Ihe public authorities: the 
adopted measures must be reasonable. It is on the basis of this criterion 
that it will exen its control. It makes the poim thal the Constitution jm~ 
poses the adoption of a co~ordinated and comprehensive state housing 
programme, implying the various levels of government; national, provin-
cial and local. Such a programme is required, according to the circum-
stances, to meet with short, medium, and long term needs. In this respect, 
"a programme that excludes a significant segment of society cannol be 
said to be reasonable". 
The examination of the legislation, in particular of Ihe national law of 
1997 and the law of the province of the Weslern Cape of 1999, then leads 
the Court to assess the extent of the accomplished efforts. curther, it 
indicates thaI, put aside from the Cape Metro land programme adopted 
after the eviction of the Grootboom group, no measure facilitates access to 
temporary help for people in desperate need - people who have no access 
to land, no roof over their heads, people who are liVing in intolerable con-
ditions, who are in crisis because of natural disasters or because their 
homes are under threat of demolition. The jurisdiction will conclude from 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
it (hal, compared to the lor:al situation of ar:ute shortage of housing. the 
state violated the obligations assigned by section 26. paragraph 2 in that 
no provision was made for relief to the categories of people in desperate 
need. 
Several remarks can be made concerning this reasoning. The Court 
started by rejecling the idea developed in the decisions of the UniLed 
Na(ions Committee of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, according 
to which states must satisfy at least the minimum core of socio~econmjc 
rights. determined by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable 
group. However, one can wonder whether its analysis does nOl lead to the 
definition of sur:h minimal r:OnlenLs'H. Even limited to the concreLe case, 
the official report of vioiarion seems to establish "the obligation for the 
public power to act in the most serious situations""). It is true, on the other 
hand, that the constitutional jurisdiction refuses to acknowledge in a 
general way the right of any applicant to claim housing immediately. In 
this respect, the right established by section 26 can be distinguished from 
other social rights whose effective realization implies in theory that each 
holder benefits from an official service, like the right to elememary in-
strUClion or the right to social help It results rather in an overall policy 
including, in addition to access to emergency assistance, the construC[ion 
of residences, measures facilitating the access to land, the supply of 
certain services etc. The South African Court refuses, however, to leave 
the whole determination of the content of the right of access to housing to 
the public authorities. It thus specifies the content of the constitutional 
standard, an acknowledgement of deficiency exposing public authorities 
to censure. 
Surprisingly, the principles of the control exerred by the rrench Consti-
tutional Council on the state concerning housing are much vaguer. Ac-
cording to the above-mentioned expressions, the High Court returns to the 
legislator and the government, within the framework of their respective 
competencies, the care to determine the methods of implementing the 
constitutional objective. The only limit laid is not "to deprive it of legal 
guarantees". The expression means prohibiting the total absence of 
concretisation. But the Constitutional Council does not specify its content 
and does not exerr any control over (he state's im pie mentation of the 
right. Social housing poliCies and measures aimed at regulating private 
housing, for example, the institution of a tax on vacant residences:'o or 
regulation of leasing agreements. form part of stateploicy aimed at fulfill-
ing the right.: ' Such measures prevail in the French constitutional case 
law. The objective of decent housing appears then to justify. say. the 
restriction of the rights of the owner in order to stabilise the situation of 
the tenant. It is rather used in this situation to justify the legislative provi-
sions. Moreover, it serves to justify the legislative provisions. 
j 8 0 Bikhi(z 2003' 4 
19 X Philippe 200 I . 402 
20 c.e., nOle 98-403 DC ot 24 july J948, Ta.xe d·inhabita.tion, COilS. note 2U, 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE ANI1 SOUTH AFRICA 
Regarding sociiil housing, however, the judgments of the Constitutional 
Council iippear to limit the actions of the legislawL For example, in a 
decision of 1995, it was called upon W consider a provision which sought 
to reduce finance allocated to social housing. It judged that this reduction 
was not "likely to challenge the objective of constitutional \/alue relating (Q 
the possibility for any person of having a decent housing"'<. This decision 
seems (Q sanction a manifest regression. But one could raise the "formal" 
aspect
n 
of the exerted COntrol. Only significant state disengagement from 
its social housing policy seems, according to the current case law, to 
expose itself to the censure of the French constitutional judge. 
The different attitudes of the two judges deserve to be moderated. Such 
different approaches are also due panly to the methods and moment of 
control, factors outside their control. In South Africa, citizens' concrete 
requests were submitted a posteriori to the Constitutional Court asking for 
clarification on what the individual could claim on the basis of section 26 
of the Constitution. Here the Coun took care to note that reasonableness 
must be determined on the facts of each case. On the contrary, French 
control is exclusively abstract and a priori. Moreover, more cases linked to 
the regulation of private law relationships and the right of ownership have 
been submitted to and decided by the Constitutional CouncJI compared to 
cases related to social housing. llowever, the French Council seems to 
adopt an attitude of self-restraint. !-=or exam pie, a decision. of 1998 con~ 
cerned a provision of law which provided that, before the police force 
could execute a court order of eviction, the administrative authority had to 
make sure that an offer of accommodation, taking into account the family 
structure, was made to the expelled people. The ConstitU[ional Council 
invalidated this provision because it was likely to challenge the separation 
of powers: the execution of a court order should not depend on a prelimi~ 
nary administrative step, the administration is able to refuse the execu-
tion of a decision of eviction only in cas~ of exceptional circumstances 
linked to the safeguarding of public order," The CounCil did not take this 
opportunity to establish the existence of a state duty to aid people likely to 
find themselves without a roof 
The decisions of the Council suggest thiit the constitutional objective 
provides the basis of a state policy, but does not create a prerogative 
directly invocable by the individual. This could be interpreted as a refusal 
on the pan of the Constitutional Council to sanction a true "right to hous-
ing". Indeed, this category has allowed the Constitutional Council to 
establish standards not directly written in the Constitution, but which 
relate to the safeguarding of public order, respect of the freedom of oth· 
ers, protection of public health, the fight against tax evasion, pluralism, 
acceSSibility and intelligibility of the law," The absence of direct applica· 
bility of the objective relating to housing is confirmed by an examination 
of the case law of the ordinary jurisdictions. 
22 C C , note 45· 17 I DC of 29 December 1995, La! de jl/lances rectificative puur /995, 
cons no(~ 6 
23 X PrelO! I CJ97. g 73 
24 C.C., nQ(e 98 -4031)( oj' 29 July 199H, tau d·inhabill..llian. Lons note 47 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
1.2 The position of the French ordinary courts 
Currently. an individual cannot claim a "right to housing" in any of the 
French ordinary courts, neither on the basis of the Constitution. nor one 
of the international treaties. 
1.2.1 The absence of direct applicability of the consistutional 
objective 
The inability of an individual to avail himself of his constitutional right to 
decent housing was asserted in a very dear way by the Conseil d'Etat in a 
case of 2002. The case was 5ubmitred to the highest administrative court 
within the framework of an emergency procedure of rejere liberte. aiming 
at protecling "fundamemal freedoms". According LO a law of 2000 that 
came imo effect in 200 J, the administrative judge can pronounce on an 
issue regarding the protection of a fundamental freedom. but three condi-
tions need to be fulfilled. One needs initially a serious and obviously illegal 
attack against a fundamemal freedom. Secondly. the a[(ack must be that 
of a legal entity ruled by public law or an organisation ruled by private 
law. in charge of the management of a public utility. Lastly. the petition 
must be Justified by emergency. The legislator did not define the concept 
of "fundamental freedom" and did not give any Jist. It is thus administra-
tive case law which has {O define the ambit of this concept. 
In the 2002 case, a social assistance association could not accommodate 
families arriving in its centres since it was not authorised {O accommodate 
children. It asked the Administrative Coun [Q enjoin the administrative 
authority to take measures likely to ensure the "right to housing" of these 
families: by granting {O the association necessary subsidies, permanent 
hiring of hotel rooms, and requisitions. The "Administrative Coun" (court 
of first instance) having refused the application, an appeal was referred 
back to the Conseif d'Etat. However. it held in a ruling of 3 May 2002. 
Association de reinsertion sociale du Limousin, referring explicitly to the 
constitutional case law, that the conditions for application of the law were 
not fulfilled. It made the point that this case law established a mere objec-
tive of constitutional value, "and not a right to housing having standing of 
constitutional principle. 2" The adm inistrative judge refused to acknowledge 
a minimal obligation placed on public powers to aid people in situations of 
distress. This judgment is based on the widely accepted idea according to 
which an "objective of constitutional value" is not a fundamental right nor 
a fundamental freedom. It does not confer on the individual any Justici-
able right Jan criticised this absence of direct applicability by recalling 
that in its first decision of 1995. the Constitutional Council stated that the 
implementation of the objective was a function of the legislator and the 
government. He argues that this expression "should be interpreted as 
obliging (he administrative authority to respect this objective" which 
would allow "citizens to rely upon it usefully in front of the administrative 
26 C E .. ord ref, 3 MdY 2002, A-~suci(({iun de reinsertion sociale du Llmuus/n et alltres, rll 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
courts".:7 On the contrary, the constitutional and administrative jurisdic-
tions both agree to interpret the objective as a standard entitling (or 
obliging) Ihe stale to follow a housing policy. BUI Ihey do not give the 
objective a specific content, other than the one the legislation gives it. The 
Council does not make it possible for an individual to claim a service 
which is nOI established by the law. In contrast, the South African Consti-
tutional Court, by controlling the reasonable character of the adopted 
measures, reserves the possibility of givtng its own interpretation of the 
constitutional standard and to sanction the non-realisation of certain 
requirements. The Consei! d'Etat reiterated its refusal to apply directly the 
constitutional objective in a second case of reJere liberte, Judged a few 
days after the first one. In the FoJana deCision of 22 May 2002, families 
occupying legally unhealthy private residences asked to benefit from 
social housing during the time necessary (0 rehabilitate of their private 
residences. The Conseil answered soberly that the circumstances of the 
case did not show "any serious and obvIOusly illegal attack against a 
fundamental Freedom":'~ 
Currently, such a fundamental right results neither from the constitu-
(ional case law nor from [he international treaties of which france is 
member. 
1,2,2 The absence oj a "right to housing" directly invocable on the 
basis oj international treaties 
Section 55 of the I'rench Constitution provides that "treaties or agree-
ments duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts 
of Parliamem, subjecc, in regard to each agreement, to its application by 
the other party". In a decision of 1975, the Constitutional Council decided 
that it was not competent "to consider the consistency of a statute with 
the provisions of a treaty or an international agreement"."''i This task 
belongs to ordinary jurisdictions, which can apply a treaty rather than an 
Act of Parliament which conflicts with that treaty. However, the possibility 
of availing oneself of a "right to housing" on the basis of international 
provisions also seems excluded: the treaties proclaiming socio~economic 
rights in general are not regarded as directly applicable. The Conseil d'Etat 
adopted this position with regard to, inter alia, the European Social Charter'O 
and the the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.' The ruling of3 May 2002, Association de reinsertion socia!e du 
Limousin, seems to adopt a position of prinCiple concerning the questions 
of housing. Having rejected the existence of a "right to housing" of con-
stitutional value, the Consei! d'Etat adds that "the stipulations relating to 
the access of the private individuals (Q housing that are contained in 
certain International Conventions rarified by France create obligations 
2.7 P Jail 2002: 19. 
2H C.E, 22 Muy 200L M. t't Mme Fo/ana e{ mltres, note 242193. 
29 C C . (HJIC 74-54 UC of 15 January 1975. lye .. cons. note 7 
30 CF.. 20 Aprll 19H6. Aidle Vl1lton. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
only between the States members of those conventions and do not pro~ 
duce a direct effect concerning the private people"." Deschamps notes, 
however. "that it would be more 10?iCal and advisable to study individu-
ally the effect of these stipulations".' 
Taking into account this case law, one might wonder whether the right 
to housing is likely to be protected on another basis, in particular on the 
basis of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the French 
ordinary courts apply regularly. This text does not establish any social 
rights. However, European case law has considered housing conditions in 
two ways. In the case Lopez Ostra against Spain of 9 December 1994, the 
European Court held that the right of the applicant to respect for her 
home and her private and family life had been violated because of a 
waste-treatment plant near her home which released gas fumes and 
noxious smells." The Court held that the Spanish state had fatied to fulfil 
its obligation to guarantee positively the rights set out in article 8 of the 
Convention, and that Spain was therefore in violation of the Convention 
because of the conditions which caused a danger to the applicant. Al-
though this case appears to take into account the need for adequate living 
conditions, it also illustrates, however, the indirect protection of rights as 
regards environment more than housing. The question of housing was 
again considered by the European Court in a case dealing with legislation 
restricting the right of ownership. It held that a law regulating rent," or 
conditions of cancellation of a lease and recovery of its property by the 
owner, did not violate the Convention. ," This type of regulation interferes 
with fundamental rights, in particular the right of ownership and contrac-
tual freedom but such state intervention is acceptable in order to facilitate 
access to, and maintenance of, private housing. In the James decision of 
21 February 1986, the Eurupean Court recognised the legitimacy of such 
regulations: 
eliminating what are Judged to be social injustices is an example of the func-
tions of a democratiC legislature. More especially, modern societies consider 
huusmg uf the pupulatiun to be a prime social need, the regulatiun of which 
cannot entirely be left to the play of market forces.~! 
In this case, the Court held that the right to respect of ownership in prop-
erty was not violated by a law making it possible to force owners to sell 
their properties, at defined conditions and prices, to tenants of houses 
benefiting from long (18-99 year) leases. Professor Sudre noted that this 
decision analysed the question of housing in the Convention "by inver-
sion"," not by the acknowledgement of a right, but by the recognition of a 
.32 C.E, ord. rN, 3 May 2002, Associlltwn de n!msertion SOl:wle du LlrmJl1.~1n ef aulres 
.3.3 E Deschamps 2U02: 820 
34 Eur. CalirI 11,R.. Lopez Ostra v Spain. judgment at 9 l)ecember J 9')4 
35 Fur. Court 11,R. Mel/ather and others v Austria. Judgment of 19 l)t~ccJl\bf;r 19H9. A 169 
36 Eur. (oun !-l.R .. Spadea and ScalaVrino v fta/y. judgment of 2H September J 995, A 315 
13; Eur. Coun H.H .. Velosa Barreto v Porlllgilf. judgment of 21 Nuverllber 1995, A 334. 
37 Em. COlIn II It,j(lmeS and othas v rhl:' Unaed Kmydom, judgnwr11 of 21 Feuruary J986, 
A 98. § 47. 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
legitimate goal of restriction of the right of ownership. Once again, the 
individual is nOL likely to avail himself of the European Convention on 
HUman Rights before the French ordinary jurisdictions [Q claim the pro-
tection of a "right to housing". There is a noticeable similarity in the 
approach of the European Court and the French constitutional case law 
relating to the constitutional objective of decent housing. 
However, things could change on the basis of article .3 of the Conven-
tion, which provides that "no one should be subjected to torture or [Q 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". In a case of 2002, an 
applicant complained about the violation of her property rights: she had 
not received a social benefit for three years because she had not applied 
for it according to the procedure established by Russian law. The Euro-
pean Court dismissed her action as inadmissible, but added at the end of 
its decision that: 
the Court conSiders that a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount or pen-
SIon and the other social benefits may, in pnnciple, raise an Issue under article 
3 of the Convention which prOhIbIts inhuman or degrading treatmenl. How-
ever, on the basis of the material in its possession, the Court finds no indicallon 
that the amount of the applicant'S pension and the additional social bene-
fits has caused such damage to her physical or menlal health capable of attain-
ing [he minimum level of severity falling within the ambit of article '3 of the Con-
1~ 
ventlon 
One wonders it· homelessness could not be considered as a situation 
causing such damage [Q the individual's physical or mental health that it 
could be seen as attaining the minimum level of severity, thus placing it 
within the ambit of article 3 of the Convention. Without recognising the 
right for any applicant to claim hOUSing immediately, maybe the Euro-
pean Court could concede on this basis the obligation of the state to 
provide temporary relief to people without a roof over their heads, ac-
cording to the circumstances of each case. Whilst there is no explicit 
norm relating to housing in the Convention, this position would be closer 
to South African constitutional case law than to the French approach. 
Indeed, in France, the constitutional objective is interpreted as estab-
lishing a purpose likely to be implemented by direct interventions - social 
hOUSing - as well as indirect interventions - regulation of renter-tenant 
connections and of the private housing market in general. This attitude 
contrasts with that of the South African Constitutional Court, which has 
deduced more precise obligations from section 26, in particular the obli-
gation on the state to establtsh a complete and co-ordinated hous-
ing programme implemented by the national and local authorities. The 
Constitutional Council's refusal to directly apply the constitutional objec-
tive has led to problems in the control of housing policies. This issue is 
discussed further below. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
HOUSING POLICY 
The case law deals with the conflict between the implementation of 
housing policy and fundamental rights on the one hand. and the division 
of competences between the state and non~central state organs on the 
other hand. 
2.1 The conflict with fundamental rights 
The Constitutional Council recognised that any legislative intervention in 
private law relationships, primarily in favour of the tenam, concerns the 
implementation of the constitutional objective of decent housing, In this 
situation. the objective is generally used to justify restrictions on (the 
owner's) traditional fundamental rights and freedoms. This first aspect of 
housing policy thus concerns cases that delineate constitutionally accept-
able limitations of certain fundamental rights, in the name of a social 
interest recognised by the Constitution. 
llistorically. this intervention especially took the form of the regulation 
of the lessor-lessee relationship. Much of the legislation pre-dated the 
recognition of a constitutional objective relating to housing, However, a 
law enacted in 2000 obHges the owner to deliver (0 the tenant, where its 
principal dwelling is involved. "decent housing". The expression is one 
used by the Constitutional Council in connection with the housing objec-
tive. If housing does not satisfy the criteria defined by the law and the 
decree:u the tenant can request that the owner take steps to bring it into 
line with the law. and can even submit the case to the court. who will 
determine the nature of work to carry out and the moment of its execu-
tion. If the owner does not fulfill its obligatiOns. the judge can reduce the 
amount of the rental. The Constitutional Council held that this new obliga-
tion weighing on the owner violated neither the owner's right to property, 
nor freedom of contract. 41 
The most notable recent intervention concerning housing dates from 
the law relating to the fight against exclusions of 1998. which contains a 
great number of provisions on access to housing,4.~ urban utilities and 
maintenance of housing4'1 Its provisions were especially criticised in front 
of the Constitutional Council on the grounds that they restricted the rights 
of owners. I'or example. in order to Increase the capacity of the private 
market to meet rhe housing need, rhe legislator intended to dissuade 
owners from leaving their properties unoccupied by instituting a tax on 
vacant residences. The Constitutional Council admitted the consritutional· 
Ity of this provision. provided that the tax is only levied on liveable resi-
clences. "whose vacancy is due only to the will of their holder"." 
40 I' Bn<illd ;~()02: 3S7··359 
41 e.e.. note 20flO-,136 DC of 7 j)eu:rTltJer 2000, SHU, con:) I\ule 56. 
42 I{ wfore I (JIJI), 2H3 304 
,13 F Sarkat 19(J1)' ")05·· 122 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Another measure of the law of 1998 deserves memion as it implies 
strong restrictions on the right of ownership: it concerns the ins(i(Utlon of 
a new procedure of requisition which makes it possible to lease, for six [Q 
twelve years, a property which has been unoccupied for eighteen momhs, 
This new procedure aims (Q avoid the dirriculties encountered in imple-
menting the requisitions instituted by a law of 1945. and is especially 
conceived for periods of crisis, such as war or natural disaster. The new 
requisition, can be implemented by the administrative authority "in the 
communes (towns) where exist imponant imbalances to the detriment of 
people with modest incomes and underprivileged people".1:" The Constitu~ 
tiona I Council noted the existence of many basic procedural guarantees to 
protect the owner. The Council declared the law in conformity with the 
Constitution under two conditions. Firstly, persons beneFiting From the 
law were not entitled (0 occupy the premises after the end of the lease 
period. Secondly. a court may order the repair of any damage which 
exceeds that covered by the allowance envisaged by the law4~ 
This decision was controversial. It should be remembered that the Con-
stitutional Council invalidated the provision which appeared to subordi-
nate (he execution of a court order of eviction to a preliminary offer of 
rehousing by the adrninistration.-\7 Rousseau asserts that the second 
condition aims at "dissuading limitations or infringements of the right of 
ownership while making them more expensive for the taxpayers"4~ and 
that, generally, "the right of ownership appears better and more protect-
ed than the right for any person to have a decent housing"" Lachaume 
and Pauliat argue, on the contrary, that the Constitutional Council vali-
dated excessive restrictions on the right of ownership, thereby negating 
its staCUs as a fundamental righc. ~,L' In spite of these arguments. the Consti-
tutional Council makes it clear that in order to implement the constitu-
tional objective of decent housing. the legislator can limit the right of 
ownership but cannot negate ie
sl 
An important restriction can be ac-
cepted if it is surrounded by appropriate guarantees. The legislator muse 
not empty the right to property of its meaning, but it is always hard to 
draw a line between what concerns the substantial content of a right and 
what does not. The Constilulional Council judged lhat this line was 
crossed in a decision of 2000. Thal case concerned housing subsidised by 
a public institution. The provision in question planned that. at the expira-
tion of the currenl convention, those dwellings would continue to be 
adminislered in the same way (allocation under conditions of income, 
maximum rentals set by lhe administralive authority) even in case of 
transfer. The Constitutional Council judged that, even if this provision aimed 
45 cr [Io[e [.cIvill 1999 207 223 
16 c.e., note 98-403 DC of 29 July [998, cuns IIUI(: '2--33 
47 CL supra. [ J.2 
4H [) KOll~SC(-lll 1999. gO 
,19 Ibid, 89 
50 J-r Lachaumf' and H Pdlllidl 1999.373-11)1 
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at implementing a constitutional objective, it was nevertheless making 
excessive, and constitutionally unacceptable, inroads into contractual 
liberty." 
The circumstances in which the South African Constitutional Court con-
sidered a conflict between the right to have access to adequate housing 
and other fundamental rights are different. In the KYfliami case, the Con-
stitutional Court found that the government decision to establish a transit 
camp on a prison farm belonging to the State was lawful. This decision 
did not place a specific burden on private owners' rights so that, contrary 
lO the French judgment. (he Court did not have LO decide on the lim its 
that the implementation of section 26 permits on other persons' rights 
The main contribution as regards the right to access to housing lies in the 
Court's re-assertion of a constitutional state duty to provide help to people 
in distress. 
2,2 The division of competences between the state and 
non-central state organs 
Prior to 1990, French local initiatives as regards assistance with housing 
were optional and in practice rather scattered. Let us recall that according 
to article 72 of the Constitution then in Force, prior to the constitutional 
revision of March 2003, local organs were "self-governing through elected 
councils and in the manner provided by statute", Constitutional case law 
had specified the guarantees of free administration: in addition to the 
election of the deliberating assemblies enVisaged by article 72, it reqUired 
in particular that the legislator would allocate to non-central state organs 
effective responsibilities, and would equip them with own resources. 
However, the Constitution did not include, and still does not include, any 
list of the competences allocated to the vJrious categories of local organs. 
This allocation is done by law. The law of 31 May 1990 allocated certain 
competences to the departement concerning social assistance and social 
action_ It thus chose to associate, through contracts, the state and the 
departement ,in order to guarantee the access of all to decent housing. 
The broad outlines of the law were as follows. The law created the "de-
partmental plans of action for the housing of the disadvantaged people". 
set and implemented by the state and the departement. The other local 
organs and the other public institutions concerned were associated. The 
plan had firstly to determine the categories of people called to profit from 
it. The law, however, obliged the authorities to give priority to people and 
Families without housing, those threatened with eviction without alterna-
tive accomodation and those Jiving in slums and unhealthy, precarious or 
makeshifts dwellings. The plan. had to set out, according to the listed 
needs, the means necessary to guarantee its beneFiciaries access to or 
maintenance of housing through centralisation of the applications, in-
crease in the offer of residences and especially financial assistance. In 
order to provide proper financial assistance, the plan was required to 
institute mutual aid funds for housing, which would provide financial aid 
to tenants in difficulty (guarantees, loans, subsidies). 










































THE RIGHT TO HOUSING IN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
The law was criticised before the Constitutional Council on two poims. 
It provided that, in the absence of an agreement between the administra-
tive authority and the executive of the deparrement, the plan could be 
determined by the ministers concerned. The Constitutional Council held 
that this provision was not contrary to the principle of free administration 
of a local organs.~-l It stressed the fact that "(0 promote the housing of the 
underprivileged people answers a requirement of national interest" 
The role given to the state seemed Lo be justified by this requirement. In 
addition, the law provided that the contribution of the departement to the 
mutual aid funds for housing must be "at least equal" to that of the state. 
The Constitutional Council judged that the legislator could define obliga· 
tory categories of expenditure for local organs under three conditions. The 
obligations had to "be defined with precision as to their purpose as well as 
their range":~4 they should not violate their own competence nor their 
free administration. According to some authors, this last condition deals 
with "the extent of the sums put at the disposal of the local organ"," in 
other words, it introduces the idea of a "quantitative threshold"~o that 
could not be to exceeded. In this case, the Constitutional Council held that 
these conditions were fulfilled. Let us note that in a decision of 2000, it 
added that the obligations, financial or otherwise, imposed on the local 
organs must also "answer constitutional reqUirements or contribute to 
general interest goals,,57. This condition does not, however. raise difficul-
ties concerning the housing policy since it meets a constitutional value 
objective 
This case law seems to favour the recognition of a "driving role"~~ 
played by the State, whtch results in the definition of a "national policy of 
housing".~~ At the same time, the need for meeting the concrete needs of 
the population results in recognising the important role of local organs in 
its implementation. Further it should be noted that the increased role of 
the locaf authorities in the implementation of the plan is one of the objec-
tives of the law of 1998 concerning the fight against evictions. Also, the 
new provisions aim at concentrating on the categories of people having 
priority and assign as a goal the provision of durable access La decem 
housing to these categories.
OJ 
Another important aspect of the housing policy consists in fighting 
against segregation and regrouping of the most underprivileged layers of 
the population in certain districts. The legislator thus posed an ambitious 
objective of "social mixing". One of the means of realisation considered is 
to make all the urban communes (towns) offer, in the long term, a section 
of SOCial housing equivalent to 20 % of the number of the dwellings of the 
53 C.C, note 9ll 274 DC of 29 May 1990. Droit au /oyement. U)[l~ Ilule j 3 
S4 Cons. 16 
55 B GenevoJs J 990' 676 
S6 GYede11991: 17 
57 ce .. note 2UOO 436 DC ot 7 Decernber 2000, cons flUle 12. 
58 E-P (,ulselln 2003. 5 
59 Ibid 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
town. Set in 1991. this goal of 20 % was reinforced by law SRU of 2000. 
The new provisions concern communes of 3 500 inhabitants or more, 
located in agglomerations of more than 50000 inhabitants and including 
at least a town of 15 000 inhabitants. A levy on their taxes incomes is 
instituted - which cannot exceed 50 % of the amount of their functioning 
real expenditures - and is allocated to the social housing construction. 
The commune determines its objective of increase in social housing over 
three years but the law sets a minimal percentage so that the 20% goal 
will be reached in 20 years. It was also expected that if the objective was 
not implemented, the administrative authority representing the state 
would penalise the commune concerned by doubling levies and prohibiting 
the approval of any plans to create new offices in that commune. 
The Constitutional Council considered that the levy did not decrease the 
resources 01 the communes to the point of blocking their free administra-
tion. 61 On the other hand, it censured the penalty because of its systematic 
aspect. I( estimated that by instituting such a penalty, "without distin~ 
guishing the nature or the value 01 the reasons of the delay"" of the 
commune in the achievement of its objectives, the legislator ignored the 
principle of free administration of article 72 of the Constitution. This 
censure removed the principal innovation of the text and its obligatory 
nature. However. a law of 11 December 200 I restored a revised penalty. 
bringing the law in line with the Constitutional Council decision. crom 
now on, in the event that a commune fails to meets its objective, the 
administrative authority can raise the levy up to a maximum of twice the 
Original levy. Importantly. the state administration must, before making 
this decision, take into account the importance of the difference between 
objectives and realisation, the difficulties possibly encountered by the 
commune, and the projects of social housing under development."\ 
rrom these cases, it emerges that the legislator can impose constraints, 
sometimes considerable, on local organs in order to implement a bal~ 
anced and effective housing policy. However, the Ireedom of the non-
central state organs is established as primary: housing policy, even to 
meet a constitutional aim, can only bring strictly justified restrictions to 
that freedom. Furthermore, a constitutional revision of March 2003 rein~ 
forced the free administration of the local authorities. It is likely that the 
guarantee of free administration above social rights will be the subject of 
constitwional case law to come"'~ 
The South African experiment could be instructive since the provinces 
benefit from a legislative power. The Crootboom decision underlines the 
need for an engagement of the three levels of government: nationa!, 
provincial and local However. it specifies that "the national sphere of 
hi C C, nute 2000 436 DC of 7 i)t:c('Jllbt-!r 2000. cons. nole 18 
6.:! COilS. (l0[(' 47. 
61 1.01 note 200 I J 168 or I 1 DeC<'tTlber 2001, journal a/flewl de la Rt;pllblique fTan~w,w: of 
12 f)p([![ntJcr 2001, iUI 24 al 1')70B. Cf J-P IJrollant 2002: 182 185; [Deschamps 
2002. 2 J 8 223. 










































THE R1GHT TO HOUS1NG lN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFR1CA 
government must assume responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, 
programmes and strategies are adequate to meet the state's section 26 
obligations".';s The Court thus, like the Constitutional Council. seems [0 
acknowledge a "driving part" [0 the central level of government which 
consists in setting the general framework of the housing poliCY. The 
assertion of this driving role is not, however, accompanied by precise 
instructions regarding the responsibilities resting on local bodies, in 
particular when concrete requests for housing are submitted to them. This 
uncertainty is likely to raise diffjculties in practice. 
The different approaches of the constitutional courts in France and 
South Africa thus do not prevent the appearance of problems common to 
both countries 
The Constitutional Council established a mere objective which is useful 
primarily, within the framework of the abstract and a priori judicial review 
of laws, to justify restrictions on economic rights like the right of owner-
ship and contractual freedom. This interpretation of the constitutional 
objective seems likely to bring limitations to fundamental rights, but not 
to their substantial content. It should be noted, however, that this ap-
proach is consistent with the case law of other European Constitutional 
COUllS, specifically the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian COUllS."· On the 
other hand, the Soulh African Court has specified the obligations weighing 
directly on the public power, in particular the duty to establish a coordi-
naled and complete programme of housing 
One notes, however, that in the two countries the constitutional stan-
dard is concretised by an overall poliCy, with varied instruments. In this 
respect, the Grootboom decision only draws a restricted right: aid in the 
most urgent situations. This decision should not negate the value of South 
African constitutional case law for the French lawyers, who endlessly 
discuss an alleged conflict between the right to private property and the 
"right to housing". The right to housing can only rely on national solidariLY 
and thus reqUires concrete financial and other services by the state, which 
is the only institution able to implement this solidarity. By burdening the 
state with an obligation to provide services, the South African Coun has 
shaped an operational concept of the right to housing, which makes a 
useful contribution to French debates. 
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